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I. Introduction
No matter what they make, do, or sell, every single organization in the world relies 
ultimately on one thing: people. Whether working for a company, a campaign, or a 
cooperative, the quality of the people involved has a direct impact on the success 
achieved therein. In an attempt to make the most of the workers that they have nearly 
every organization across the globe undertakes some level of training. Whether 
demonstrating how to use a hammer or holding a week-long retreat on corporate culture 
and structure, it is difficult to find an organization that does not have some form of 
training or another. Through training the organization hopes to improve the quality or 
quantity (or both) of the produced output. Training is an improvement in human capital 
of the organization by means of an investment in the individual.' This investment is not 
without costs. Instructional materials, foregone production of instructors, and travel costs 
are some of the ways in which organizations pay for training. As with any cost of 
production, the cost of training must be kept to a minimum for the organization to 
continue forward in its work. Since organizations create training curricula based on what 
they think their people might eventually need, it is difficult to measure the exact marginal 
returns from trailing. Perhaps the simplest way to maximize the return from training is 
not to focus on or limit the amount of training each individual receives, but rather to limit 
the number of people the firm has to train by reducing turnover in the workforce. In 
industries where turnover is traditionally high, such as retail sales, reduction in that
' Kline (1993) discusses the commitment that a firm makes in en^loyees by investing resources in training 
on machines and software. Here training is expanded to include interpersonal skills and company-specific 
procedures.
turnover could improve the overall well-being of that industry.^ With applications 
ranging from strengthening a post-draft military to increasing volunteer hours at the local 
food bank, turnover reduction has important implications. Here, training investments will 
be explored in the context of a university’s residence life (or ‘dorm’) system, though 
extensions to many other applications may easily be made.
IL Example for Analysis
Post-secondary education involves the interaction of many seemingly disparate units. 
Academics, sports, co-curricular opportunities, and social activities each play an 
important role in the overall educational experience at a college or university. One such 
co-curricular endeavor is student employment. Departments on every university campus 
have come to depend upon work done by undergraduate students in a wide variety of 
tasks. Unfortimately for those departments, the average undergraduate student spends an 
only four or five years at the university before moving on. This means that in the best 
case scenario, where freshman fill all available positions and continue the same job for 
the tenure of their undergraduate education, departments can expect to lose between one- 
fourth and one-fifth of their workforce every year. In the Office of Residence Life 
(OUR) at Western Washington University (WWU), the majority of students employed as 
Resident Advisors will work in that position for only one or two years. This means that 
the OUR regularly loses more than half of its workforce annually. Antidote suggests that 
a similar pattern exists at other universities. If students were hired and trained in their 
freshman year for employment beginning their sophomore year and those same
^ BLS (2006) provides turnover as a percent of employment. For the period between September 2005 and 
August 2006, Retail Sales, Accommodation and Food Services, and Leisure and Hospitality had the highest 
turnover whereas Education, Finance and Insurance, and Wholesale Trade had the lowest industry turnover 
rates.
individuals continued to work the following three years, turnover could be reduced to 
one-third of the workforce each year. Should departments such as the OUR concern 
themselves with retaining individuals from year to year? If so, how should this task be 
accomplished? Using primarily microeconomic cost-analysis on the former question and 
game theory for the latter, the OUR of WWU will provide a backdrop for an investigation 
that has implications in a myriad of industries.
III. Improving Returns from Training
As an organization in at high-tumover industry, the Office of University Residences 
(OUR) of Western Washington University (WWU) has a vested interest in exploring the 
impact of such turnover on the organization. Students employed as Resident Advisors 
(RA’s) often work only one year, with a minority working two or perhaps even three 
years. Since RA’s act as the principle agents and inputs in providing “secure, 
comfortable, and affordable housing.. .within a diverse community that encourages 
academic success and personal growth,” should the OUR concern itself with improving 
the rate of returning RA’s in an effort to provide the best service possible?
A. Equations
To build an accurate picture of the cost of “producing” or training RAs, consider the
following variables and equations:^
Qa = Number of new applicants, where Qa ^
On = Number new RAs, where (Jn ^
Qr = Number returning RAs, where Qr ^
Qt = Number total RAs, where Qt = Qr + On 
ai(X) = Cost of placing X-type RA, where N = New and R = Returning 
7 = Peer effects of returning RAs helping to mentor and to train new RAs 
Of = Fixed cost of new RA class
(Xv = Variable cost of new RA class (buttons, copies, group leaders, etc.) 
jS = cost of training one RA for fall (same for New and Returning RAs) 
a = Cost of new RA selection process, per applicant
^ Katz and Rosen (1998) provides theoretical basis for analyzing costs of production.
The cost of training and placement for a new RA can then be modeled by:
Cn = a*QA + On* cj(n) + a + aV*Qn + (E. 1)
The cost of returning an RA, including both placement and fall training, is expressed by: 
CR = QR*co(r) + ^QR-7*QR (E.2)
Total cost of training and placement is simply the sum of (E.l) and (E.2):
Ct = Cr + Cn (E.3)
Expanded and re-arranged, (E.3) becomes:
Ct = a*QA + oiF + Ofv*QN + Qn* w(N) + Qr* co(R) + + Qr) - 7*Qr (E-3’)
Marginal Cost of a New RA (the derivative of E.3’ with respect to Qr):
MCn = c«)(N) + Ofv + jS (E.4)
Marginal Cost of a Returning RA (the derivative of E.3’ with respect to Qr):
MCR = a)(R) + i8-7 (E.5)
B. Assumptions
As in any model, a framework must be developed to work within. The following 
paragraphs explain the clarifying assumptions that will structure the discussion about the 
‘production’ or training of RA’s.
(1) At least one new RA must be trained each year.
Even if all RA’s would like to continue their position the next year, given that 
employment as an RA in the OUR is dependant upon continued enrollment at WWU one 
can assume that at least one new RA must be trained each year. To further strengthen 
this assumption, consider further that not every RA will return (choosing instead to study 
abroad, for example) and that nearly every year an RA will leave the position midyear.
(2) Number of applicants Qa is exogenous to the OUR.
The firm, OUR, has no control over number of new applicants. Once the position is 
advertised, some number of students from WWU apply. The OUR, as with any firm
publicly advertising a position, cannot control who applies, though they can later control 
who is interviewed and eventually hired.
(3) Peer Effects are felt only in communities with returning RAs.^
Some effect exists from having experience RAs to help along new RAs. If no Returner is 
available to help the New RAs, then no peer effect will exist. When present the peer 
effect reduces the cost to the OUR through mentorship and modeling of appropriate 
behavior.
(4) The Placement Cost for New RAs is greater or equal to that of Returning RAs. 
With the strengths and weaknesses of New RAs relatively unknown, at least as much 
effort must be used in placing them when compared with the known-quality Returners.
C. Implications
Combining the above equations and clarifying assumptions results in a conclusion on 
whether or not the OUR should work to retain RAs. Looking at the marginal costs in the 
best-case scenario where a)(N) = a)(R), two differences appear between new and 
returning RAs. First, new RAs have the added cost of their participation in the new RA 
training course. Second, retxmiing RAs benefit the OUR through their peer effect. It 
follows logically that the OUR should hire as many returners as possible to maximize the 
peer effect while simultaneously reducing the cost of the new RA training course. As the 
cost of placement for new RAs is (more realistically) set above that of returning RAs, the 
advantages to hiring as many returning RAs as possible becomes even more evident.
^ De Bartolome (1990) defines peer effects as “the presence of the more able” having a “large favorable 
effect” on the less able, “perhaps by inparting higher motivation.” On the job experience is transferred 
from returning employees to new employees through informal ongoing training. The exanple that 
returning employees set, according to de Bartolome, significantly affects the work of new enployees.
IV. Market Structure and Selection
A. Current Structure
Having established that it is in the best interest of the organization to return as many 
people as possible from year to year, the question of how to best accomplish this task 
comes to the forefront. Since the decision to return to or continue within an organization 
involves strategic interaction between a principal (an employer, for example) and an 
agent (such as an employee), it makes sense to engage this question of how to retain 
employees from a game-theoretic perspective. Four things must be defined in order to 
properly go about such an analysis: players, rules, payoffs, and strategies. Using the 
above framework from the OUR, the two players are defined as the OUR professional 
staff (which includes Resident Directors, or RDs) as the principal and RAs as the agent. 
The RA will choose first whether or not to return, followed by the decision by the OUR 
to offer a position (P) or not, with the RA making the final move deciding whether or not 
to accept the offered position. Since there are various communities in which a position 
can be offered, it is assumed that each RA prefers one or more positions (PO over all 
others.^ In view of the fact that difficulties arise both in quantifying and in generalizing 
valuations of P and P', payoffs will be given ordinally rather than cardinally. This 
formulation allows for easy comparison of outcomes even though an empirical “best- 
response” cannot be readily calculated. The following three examples consider different 
possible characteristics of RAs who desire to return. Most - if not all -returners can be 
classified by one of these three types, with the payoffs listed to the RA first and the OUR 
second:^
* Krautmaim and Oppenheimer (1994) puts forth the idea that preferences exist within individuals, which 
are “affected by things like location-specific amenities.”
Dixit and Skeath (2004) provides the basic structure for the examination of extended form games.
Type 1
Type 1 RAs show motivation to return, even if the preferred placement, P', is guaranteed 
to not be offered.
Type 2 RAs are slightly more difficult to please from the OUR point of view. Once an 
RA of this type has committed to return, they would accept any placement offered to 
them. On the other hand, at some given probability that P is not P - denoted Prob(P ?P')- 
this type of RA will deem that the option to not return has a better payoff than the 
weighted average of taking some position P.
RAs of type 3, like those of type 2, base their decision to return on some probability that 
they will be given one of their preferred placements. Unlike RAs of type 2, however, 
type 3 RAs would prefer to not accept an offer of placement should the offer be other 
than their preferred placement. The type 3 returner places an even greater importance on 
the probability of being offered their preferred placement than their type 2 counterparts. 
Given these three types of returners and their strategies, what should the OUR do? The 
literature suggests some kind of pre-game signal be used to indicate the type of RA each 
potential returner, but even this is not without problems. The OUR currently attempts to 
take into account the preferences of potential returning RAs by just such a signal. The 
RA who considers returning is asked by their supervising RD which placements would be 
preferred. Unfortunately, RDs are faced with a conflict of interest in that they must 
represent the preferences of their current RAs while concurrently working to create a new 
staff-team for the following year. Compounding this tension, RAs are only offered a 
single placement which they must accept or reject. This leads to a potentially two-fold 
disappointment. First, RAs that might have been great returners are either discontent 
with where they end up, or they simply quit. The latter gives way to the second 
disappointment, where the RD depending on the quitting RA is left with one less
returning staff member. Recall that, as shown above, the best outcome for the OUR is to 
return as many RAs as possible. So again, what should the OUR do?
B. Proposed Selection Model
The frictions with the current system come from two main sources: a conflict of interest, 
and the one-shot nature of the placement. By allowing RAs to act directly in their best 
interest and work directly with their potential supervisors, both of these frictions can be 
resolved. RAs could apply directly to the RD of the community (or the RDs of the 
communities) which they would prefer.^ RAs could apply to each community in which 
they would like to work - signaling their preferences - and RDs would be able to act 
accordingly. This new selection process can be modeled by the following:
Now that RAs only apply to communities (or to RDs) that they prefer, the difference 
between case 1 and case 2 lies in RD’s payoffs. In case 1, the RD turns down the 
application to return of the RA. In case 2, the RD and RA ‘match,’ resulting in best 
outcome for all parties. In these two cases, RAs still apply to RDs from whom they will 
be rejected - which could result in excessive administrative costs that outweigh the 
benefits of returning more RAs. A pre-game signal where RDs and RAs expose whether
^ The added cost of applying to each community in which the RA wants to work should decrease the 
number of such applications, with RAs only applying to those RDs with whom they have the greatest 
chance of success. Guasch and Weiss (1981) explores the phenomenon of self-selection from which this 
assertion comes.
* Farrell and Rabin (1996) proposes that “given people respond to it, talk definitely affects payoffs.” Such 
talk is particularly effective when the parties involved have “no reason to lie.”
or not they ‘match’ would reduce this excessive paper process.^ The pre-game signal 
might be facilitated by an open house of sorts where prospective returners sound out their 
preferred RDs, This raises a third case, where uncertainty exists for the RD in whether or 
not an RA would ‘match’ or not. This third case can be modeled as a probability of being 
either case 1 or case 2. In any event the signal would reduce the amount of cases known 
to be of type 1, presumably matching as many returners as possible in an efficient, open- 
market manner.
C. Further Market Effects of the Proposed Selection Model 
Each community served by the OUR has distinct characteristics which make it either
preferred or not by potential returning RAs. Conceivably, some communities could be
desired by a number of RAs that is greater than the number of positions there, or perhaps
no one prefers a given community. This conveys valuable information to those in charge
at the OUR.'° The OUR could act to change the amount of remuneration for positions on
the basis of desirability, as measured by the number of applicants. The OUR might seek,
for example, to increase compensation for those positions that are seen as less desirable
as a result of, say, a perception of higher conduct levels within a community or the more
stringent programming standards of a given RD. * * Such actions would even out the
number of returners in each community, and coupled with the absolute increase in RAs
due to better matching of preferences, the OUR decreases the cost of training new RAs
while improving the quality of the service that they provide to the campus.
Such a pre-game signal is facilitated when RDs and RAs both want the same thing: good 
en^loyee/employer compatibility. Crawford and Sobel (1982) find that “there may be a good case for 
presuming that direct commimication is more likely to play an inportant role, the more closely related are 
[the] agents’ goals.”
Riley (1979)
" Weiss (1980) argues that wages should exhibit downward rigidity should the firm want to reduce labor 
turnover. In other words, paying more for less desirable placements is not equivalent to the same as paying 
less for mqre desirable placements.
VI. Further Complications
The proceeding sections show that the organization is best-served when they retain more 
people from year to year, and that the best way to keep people is by allowing them to act 
for themselves in market-based competition. In the application of these findings the 
market, however, a few complications arise.
A. RD/Community Conflict
One such complication is that RDs may or may not return to the same community from 
year to year. In such a case would the RD pick returning staff members for the 
community in which they work now, or for the community in which the RD will be 
working? A “cut-and-choose” method would most evenly spread out talent amongst 
different staffs.*^ Equivalent to one child cutting a doughnut and another picking first 
which piece to take, the cut-and-choose method encourages a fair distribution. The 
“cutting” step would consist of each RD working to create the best community possible 
for the commumty in which the RDs are currently placed. The “choose” step, then, 
would be either a random assignment of RDs to communities or through some other 
process deemed fair by all the RDs involved.
B. Cost of RA-RD Interaction
Bargaining has costs, even if the only cost is the time lost to the individuals involved. It 
is conceivable that the sheer number of returning applications to each RD could make 
such a system of direct, market-based application so costly as to outweigh the 
advantages.'^ To avoid this, a limit on the number of returning applications each RA can 
submit to RDs could be implemented. Such a rule would also encourage RAs to partake
Dawson (1997)
Cramton (1991) talks in depth about the “transaction cost of bargaining.”
in a pre-application signaling process with RDs, increasing the likelihood that the 
applications they do submit would yield positive results.
VI. Conclusion
While this paper has focused on high-tumover industry, applications extend much 
further. The uncertainty of tomorrow makes it impossible for organizations to train their 
people in exactly what they will need to know. Training must supply a set of useful tools 
or techniques that the individual can then apply to whatever situation might arise. The 
skills taught vary by organization, but one thing remains constant: retaining trained 
people from this time period to the next improves the return from training. By keeping 
current employees, the firm not only has to pay less for overall training, but it also reaps 
the benefits of experience and peer effects. Often the problem lies within the structure of 
the organization, as it restricts the ability of well-qualified people to return from year to 
year. Introspective analysis as to the particularities can result in a more streamlined 
process, though the exact details would differ in each organization. Perhaps this means 
instituting regular wage increases, or perhaps adjusting the process through which 
individuals are chosen to return for another season. Whatever the particular solution, the 
organization requires a certain flexibility with regards to returners. People like options, 
and the more options that they are given to return, the more likely they will. Only in 
retaining more highly-qualified people can the best outcomes be achieved. After all, it is 
the people that ultimately make or break the organization.
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